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Abstract 
Objective: While many system mapping approaches (SMAs) have been broadly used in safety-critical 
industries, few have so far been employed in the healthcare field to assist in the identification of patient safety 
risks. In this study, we evaluated a set of system modelling approaches to assess their potential contribution to 
the identification of risks affecting patient safety. The aim was to gain a greater understanding of the practical 
application of system modelling approaches with the help of the risk categorisation framework developed in 
this study. 
Setting: We conducted this study in a newly established Adult Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) 
service at Cambridge and Peterborough Foundation Trust. 
Study Participants: Eight key stakeholders of the chosen service, including clinicians, managers, and 
administrative staff, were individually asked to evaluate a set of pre-defined six SMAs according to their 
usefulness in identifying patient safety risks through interview-based questionnaires.  
Results: It was found that each SMA could be useful in the chosen healthcare service in different ways. 
Further, specific types of diagrams were selected by stakeholders as more useful than others in identifying 
different sources of risks within the given system.  
Conclusions: The results of the evaluation showed that the system diagram is the most useful SMA in risk 
identification within the given system, while limited time, resources, and experience of stakeholders with 
SMAs may present possible obstacles for their potential use in the healthcare field in future.  
Key Words: System mapping approaches, patient safety, risk identification, process maps  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the publication of the Institute of Medicine (IOM) report, To Err Is Human: Building a Safer 
Health System [1], various studies have been conducted and indicated that the rate of harm remains 
high; thousands of people around the world are harmed every year [2–4]. The result of high 
frequency of medical errors suggested that further research and improvements are needed to 
improve health services and make health systems safer for patients [5].  
As one of the suggestions to improve patient safety, risk identification has been proposed within the 
scope of risk management to investigate actual and potential harm. Using various tools and 
methods, robust risk identification aims to identify a comprehensive lists of risks, since no actions 
may be taken to avoid or diminish the effects of unidentified hazards [6,7]. 
In order to better understand the risks in any systems, information and experience need to be 
available through different inputs, such as (1) knowledge of people, (2) incident reports, and (3) 
system mapping approaches (SMAs), also known as process maps, process models, and diagrams 
[8]]. In order to define a generic risk identification process, Figure 1 proved useful in showing the 
range of inputs and outputs; while the inputs are based on the National Offshore Petroleum Safety 
Authority (NOPSA) guidance [8], the risk outputs are based on the definitions given by International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO 31000) [9] and Ericson [10]. 
 
--- INSERT FIGURE – 1 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
Figure 1 shows how different inputs, treated using a range of retrospective and prospective methods 
can help identify risks as outputs. Further, their combination may clearly provide a better result in 
terms of determining a comprehensive list of risks in selected systems.  
Recent research showed that knowledge of people and incident reports added value to the overall 
risk identification process by adding different sources of risks, but none provided a comprehensive 
picture about all possible risks in the chosen healthcare setting [11]. The study therefore suggested 
for future study that applying SMAs and combining them with other two inputs might provide better 
results in risk identification. However, there is no clear evidence regarding what types of risks can be 
identified using different SMAs; their contribution to risk identification is thus still not very clear. 
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Moreover, in another recent study, it was shown that SMAs have not been introduced in 
organisation-level risk management guidance in National Health Service (NHS) settings [12]. While 
other safety-critical industries, such as chemical and aviation industries, use strategies to select 
appropriate SMAs, there is no clear evidence paralleling these practices in the healthcare field, 
particularly in the patient safety context.  
The accurate overall representation of a system is important in attempting to truly cover each 
element in the system. SMAs can therefore provide good system representation to systematically 
analyse the system in question [13]. For instance, Redmill et al. [14] highlighted that visualization 
allows workers to easily observe a system and understand how it works. The use of visual maps, 
therefore, can also aid in the identification of the critical elements of the given system [15].  
They can be used independently in risk identification, and they can also be used together with 
Prospective Hazard Analysis (PHA) methods which have recently gained awareness in healthcare to 
address the system-level determinants of patient safety [16]. For instance, PHA methods, such as 
Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA), Hazards and Operability (HAZOP), and Structured What-if 
Techniques (SWIFT), have tabular structures. Hence, visualization of healthcare systems through 
SMAs can potentially strengthen their risk identification process. In other safety-critical industries, 
many types of SMAs have been used for risk identification along with different PHA methods. For 
instance, HAZOP uses process flow diagrams and data flow diagrams to define material and 
information flow between system components and operations, while FMEA uses flow diagrams, 
functional block diagrams, and reliability block diagrams to define system components and 
functions. In some cases, multiple kinds of diagrams have been used, to enhance the understanding 
of the system from different perspectives [13]. 
While a wide range of SMAs have been used in other safety-critical industries, such as the chemical 
industry, only few have been employed in the healthcare field to assist in the identification of risks 
[13,17]. Further, it has also been found that the use of multiple SMAs is limited in the NHS; in most 
cases, flowcharts and hierarchical task analysis diagrams have been preferred [13,18]. Although 
various SMAs have the potential to generate clear descriptions of the wide range of processes 
employed in the healthcare field, time pressure can limit the number of SMA types that can be 
utilised [18]. 
In order to take full advantage of using SMAs in healthcare, Jun [13] carried out a comprehensive 
study concerned solely with the applicability of SMAs to healthcare for patient safety. Because each 
SMA has its own set of notations and layouts, Jun emphasised the need to use the correct map for 
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the analysis of a given healthcare context, and identified and characterized various types of diagrams 
applicable to the design of healthcare delivery systems [13,17]. The research also showed that other 
SMAs were helpful in understanding the diversity and complexity of the given processes. For 
instance, communication diagrams helped participants understand interactions in the system. While 
swim-lane activity diagrams helped participants understand the roles and responsibilities in a given 
system, state transition diagrams were helpful from a patient-centred perspective [17]. In another 
research, Jun and his colleagues [19] also provided an indication regarding the potential use of SMAs 
in identifying different types of hazards, such as task-related, human-resource related and 
information/material-related hazards. 
Another comprehensive study on SMAs was carried out in the development of the PHA toolkit 
developed by Clarkson et al. [20]. In this research, a number of SMAs were reviewed to consider 
their practical applicability in the healthcare context, and also to understand their possible 
associations with particular PHA methods. Regarding the review results, six distinct SMAs were 
shortlisted in the PHA toolkit, and identified as useful for providing fundamental diagrammatic 
representations to capture a range of system attributes in prospective hazard analysis applications. 
Each diagram shortlisted in the PHA Toolkit can be briefly described as follows: 
1- Task diagrams describe a hierarchy of operations and plans 
2- Information diagrams describe a hierarchy of information and/or material 
3- Organisational diagrams describe a hierarchy of people and/or roles within organisation(s) 
4- System diagrams represent how data are transferred through activities 
5- Flow diagrams represent activities occurring in sequence or in parallel 
6- Communication diagrams represent information and material flows between people and 
process 
While the diagrams can help identify risks in a chosen healthcare system, it can also be said that 
each diagram may help identify a particular type of risk since each represents the system from 
different perspectives. It is therefore imperative to understand the usefulness of each SMA in the 
identification of particular risk source within a system.  
There are various frameworks available in patient-safety context representing various error-
producing conditions and contributory factors that can help categorise different risk sources [21–
24]. The ultimate aim of such frameworks is to help understand healthcare systems by considering 
various system components to provide a comprehensive system view. Therefore such classifications 
can be useful in risk identification and potentially utilized as a reference for possible categorisation 
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of risk sources leading to situations harmful to patients. In this study, we therefore aimed to 
evaluate a range of SMAs to address their potential contribution in identifying different risk sources 
in patient safety context.  
 
2. METHODS 
2.1 Data Collection 
We first aimed to develop a risk identification framework to include various SMAs as inputs, and risk 
sources as outputs within the risk identification process. In the framework, we included six different 
SMAs as inputs, as shortlisted in the PHA Toolkit [20]. As mentioned earlier, there are a number of 
classifications that can be utilised as a reference to categorise risk sources. Although components in 
each framework is very similar to each other, we preferred to use the NPSA (National Patient Safety 
Agency) contributing factors classification framework used originally in incident reporting and root 
cause analysis within the NHS [25]. Since this study was conducted within the NHS area, study 
participants would be more familiar with the content of the NPSA framework compared to any other 
frameworks. 
In an earlier study involved the NPSA framework [11], difficulties were experienced in differentiating 
the contributing factors as distinct risk sources. To produce an accurate categorisation, some factors 
were considered subordinate to other types of risk sources. We thereby developed a risk 
identification process that includes six types of SMAs as inputs, and seven types of risk sources as 
outputs, as shown in Figure 2.  
 
--- INSERT FIGURE – 2 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
Throughout the framework, SMAs were evaluated at the newly established Adult Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) Service at Cambridge and Peterborough Foundation Trust. The Adult 
ADHD Service cares for young people experiencing significant impairment as a result of ADHD after 
the age of 17. The service aims to provide specialist diagnostic services and a range of 
pharmacological and psychosocial interventions for those with adult ADHD, to the adult population 
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of Cambridgeshire and Peterborough. These services are delivered by a multidisciplinary team of 
professionals, such as psychologists, nurses and admin staff, led by a consulting psychiatrist. 
Throughout the evaluation of SMAs, two data sets were obtained to help determine the usefulness 
of each SMA in the identification of patient safety risks at the ADHD service. 
The first data set was gathered to obtain initial data about the adult ADHD Service. This information 
was collected prior to the application and evaluation of SMAs. In order to build SMAs, initial data 
were obtained from the service leader; as the key participant in this study, the service leader 
provided all inputs needed for the research, in a number of face-to-face meetings. The internal 
procedural documents were also helpful to understand the service. Through the use of the 
Cambridge Advanced Modeller (CAM) tool [26], six types of SMAs were drawn up (see Appendix). 
When these were accomplished, the service leader was asked to confirm the suitability of the 
content of the SMAs with the real practice. Then we made further arrangements to conduct 
evaluation sessions with each stakeholder working in the chosen mental health service. 
Table 1 shows the job titles of the participants, and provides further details on their experience in 
the NHS, their familiarity and experience in using SMAs. 
 
 --- INSERT TABLE – 1 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
The second data set was collected to determine the potential contribution of SMAs to risk 
identification via individual-based workshops and questionnaires with each participant. The 
participants were then asked to indicate their level of agreement to eight statements (see Table 2) 
for supporting the use of SMAs in risk identification. Then the rankings were expressed numerically; 
to aid numerical analysis after all the data were collected. Five-point scales (poor: 1 – excellent: 5) 
were used and supported, using numerical responses to aid in numerical analysis. The participants 
were asked to tick the one option that most closely characterised their opinion, according to their 
experience with each SMA. Since we have small data sets, a test of significance for normality may 
lack power to detect the deviation of the variable from normality. In this study, we therefore 
provided only descriptive statistics, such as mean (µ), median and interquartile range. 
 
 7 
3. RESULTS  
During this study, eight participants individually evaluated six different diagrams. The statements 
and the summary statistics of the SMA evaluation are shown in Table 2 below: 
 
--- INSERT TABLE – 2 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
The results shows that the participants rated each diagram type as significantly similar, in terms of 
support for their use in risk identification. It was therefore possible to analyse the results of the 
participants’ ratings collectively. For the first statement — “The diagram is useful in identifying risks 
within the system.” — participants agreed that the most helpful diagram in risk identification is the 
system diagram, (µ = 4.5). The system diagram was followed by the flow diagram (µ = 4.1). The least 
useful diagram was found as the organisational diagram (µ = 2.8). 
With respect to the types of risk sources, it was found that some participants were familiar with such 
classifications from incident reporting and root cause analysis. Hence, it helped participants make 
correlations between SMAs and different sources of risks. It appeared that different diagram types 
are more useful in identifying different sources of risks. For instance, the participants agreed that 
that information diagram is the most useful diagram type (µ = 3.3) in identifying patient-related 
risks, while the flow diagram was the most useful diagram type in identifying communication risks (µ 
= 3.4). 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
Results indicated that each SMA has different strengths and limitations in identifying different types 
of risk sources. Therefore, depending on the nature of the system chosen, particular SMA can be 
selected to provide a more comprehensive risk identification. For instance, if a chosen system has 
mainly environmental risk sources in its content, a flow diagram or a system diagram would be more 
useful than any other type of SMAs. As a result of this study, the suitability of different SMAs can be 
illustrated, as shown in Table 3, in order to identify a particular range of risk sources. In this table, 
the diagrams are marked with two different sizes of tick marks (bigger mark means more useful) to 
show their usefulness, based on their average rates. 
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Table 3 shows the suitability of different SMAs for prioritisation according to their ability to identify a 
particular risk sources. 
 
--- INSERT TABLE – 3 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
As with earlier studies [19,27], each type of SMA was important, as each influenced the 
representation of the chosen healthcare service. It can therefore be concluded that each approach 
can identify different risk sources. As also suggested in earlier studies [27], multiple SMAs can be 
used to ensure that all risk sources are captured; therefore a better risk picture can be obtained. 
However, this is controversial and unrealistic, perhaps even a less effective approach, since lack of 
time and resources always constitutes a pressure in healthcare settings. To be pragmatic regarding 
the availability of current resources in healthcare, it should be noted that often only one SMA can be 
used. Therefore, it is always useful to know the most suitable SMA during the application of risk 
identification and further risk assessment. To address this, our study provided valuable insights, at 
least at the outset, to help understand which SMA is most useful with regard to the risk sources that 
can affect the chosen service more than others. 
In this study, a number of criteria are therefore suggested to select the most appropriate SMA, 
depending on the nature of the healthcare system. For instance, the rates of risk sources and 
incident types occurring in the past can guide healthcare organisations in selecting the most 
common risk sources in a given healthcare system. The main sources of risk in the system can be 
captured via the results of incident investigations; the most appropriate SMA can therefore be 
selected with regard to the main risk source identified in the chosen healthcare service.  This is one 
of the most significant outcomes of this study — it can help establish a bridge between retrospective 
results (e.g. incident types) and SMAs. There would, of course, be no retrospective results available 
with new services, as observed in this study. In such circumstances, stakeholders of the system can 
evaluate the system to select the most common risk sources. Therefore, the most appropriate SMA 
can be chosen to use in risk identification practices.  
While the evaluation workshops were completed successfully, a number of issues arose due to the 
complexity of some of the SMAs. As shown earlier in Table 1, participants had only limited familiarity 
and experience in using SMAs. Even when they had been given instructions by the facilitator, they 
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sometimes found the use of diagrams redundant, as well as too complex. For instance, throughout 
the SMA evaluation, most participants asked the meaning of the basic nodes, links, and functions 
used in the content of SMAs, even though the facilitator had given brief instructions earlier. It can be 
assumed, therefore, that detailed instructions and training may be needed in future research to get 
the greatest benefit from the use of SMAs in identifying patient safety risks. Moreover, it can be 
addressed that from just eight participants looking at six diagrams, it is not easy to confirm what can 
be inferred quantitatively. However, qualitative results serve as reliable indicators to consider in 
current risk identification practice and future research.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, it was noted that a number of risk sources interacted in the system, and may have 
influenced the outcome of care delivered. It is therefore important to know how fully systems and 
their components are described; their interaction is understood and applied in a dynamic and 
complex healthcare systems. Throughout the evaluation in this study, SMAs were found to be useful 
in describing the system and identifying potential patient safety risks for the chosen healthcare 
service. Further, different types of diagrams were found to be more useful than others in identifying 
particular risk sources within the given system, as shown in Table 3. While the evaluation showed 
that the system diagram was the most useful SMA in risk identification, it can also be suggested that 
amalgamation of the use of multiple maps can help identify a comprehensive list of risks; however, it 
may not always be feasible to use all SMAs in the risk identification practice, due to limited 
resources, such as limited time, financial resources, and experience of system users with SMAs. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The authors would like to thank all hospital staff who voluntarily participated in this study at the 
Adult ADHD Service at the Cambridge Peterborough Foundation Trust, UK. 
 
COMPETING INTERESTS 
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interests with respect to the authorship and/or 
 10 
publication of this article. 
 
FUNDING 
This work was partly supported by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Collaboration 
for Leadership in Applied Health Research & Care (CLAHRC) East of England, at Cambridgeshire and 
Peterborough NHS Foundation Trust. 
 
PROVENANCE AND PEER REVIEW 
Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed. 
 
 11 
REFERENCES 
1.  IOM. To Err is Human: Building A Safer Health System [Internet]. Washington: National 
Academy Press; 2000 [cited 2013 Nov 1]. Available from: 
http://www.iom.edu/Reports/1999/To-Err-is-Human-Building-A-Safer-Health-System.aspx 
2.  Classen DC, Resar R, Griffin F, Federico F, Frankel T, Kimmel N, et al. ‘Global trigger tool’ shows 
that adverse events in hospitals may be ten times greater than previously measured. Health Aff 
Proj Hope. 2011 Apr;30(4):581–9.  
3.  Kurutkan MN, Usta E, Orhan F, Simsekler MCE. Application of the IHI Global Trigger Tool in 
measuring the adverse event rate in a Turkish healthcare setting. Int J Risk Saf Med. 
2015;27(1):11–21.  
4.  Landrigan CP, Parry GJ, Bones CB, Hackbarth AD, Goldmann DA, Sharek PJ. Temporal Trends in 
Rates of Patient Harm Resulting from Medical Care. N Engl J Med. 2010;363(22):2124–34.  
5.  Bates DW, Cohen M, Leape LL, Overhage JM, Shabot MM, Sheridan T. Reducing the frequency 
of errors in medicine using information technology. J Am Med Inform Assoc JAMIA. 2001 
Aug;8(4):299–308.  
6.  Gould J, Glossop M, Ioannides A. Review of Hazard Identification Techniques. Sheffield: Health 
& Safety Laboratory (An agency of the Health and Safety Executive) .; 2005.  
7.  Battles JB, Lilford RJ. Organizing patient safety research to identify risks and hazards. Qual Saf 
Health Care. 2003 Jan 12;12(suppl 2):ii2-ii7.  
8.  NOPSEMA. NOPSEMA Hazard Identification Guidance Note. Australia: National Offshore 
Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority; 2012. Report No.: N-04300-
GN0107.  
9.  ISO 31000. ISO 31000:2009 - Risk management -- Principles and guidelines. Geneva: The 
International Organization for Standardization; 2008.  
10.  Ericson CA. Hazard Analysis Techniques for System Safety. Wiley-Blackwell; 2005.  
11.  Simsekler MCE, Card AJ, Ruggeri K, Ward JR, Clarkson PJ. A comparison of the methods used to 
support risk identification for patient safety in one UK NHS foundation trust. Clin Risk. 
2015;21:37–46.  
12.  Simsekler MCE, Card AJ, Ward JR, Clarkson PJ. Trust-Level Risk Identification Guidance in the 
NHS East of England. Int J Risk Saf Med. 2015;27(2):67–76.  
13.  Jun GT. Design for patient safety: A systematic evaluation of process modelling approaches for 
healthcare system safety improvement [Ph.D. Thesis]. [Cambridge]: Cambridge University; 
2007.  
14.  Redmill F, Chudleigh M, Catmur J. System safety: HAZOP and software HAZOP. Chichester; New 
York: Wiley; 1999.  
15.  Hollnagel E. Barriers and Accident Prevention: Or How to Improve Safety by Understanding the 
Nature of Accidents Rather Than Finding Their Causes. Ashgate Publishing Limited; 2004.  
 12 
16.  Card AJ, Simsekler MCE, Clark M, Ward JR, Clarkson PJ. Use of the Generating Options for 
Active Risk Control (GO-ARC) Technique can lead to more robust risk control options. Int J Risk 
Saf Med. 2014;26(4):199–211.  
17.  Jun GT, Ward J, Morris Z, Clarkson J. Health care process modelling: which method when? Int J 
Qual Health Care. 2009 Jan 6;21(3):214–24.  
18.  Ward JR, Clarkson PJ, Buckle P, Berman J, Lim R, Jun GT. Prospective Hazard Analysis: Tailoring 
Prospective Methods to a Healthcare Context [Internet]. Cambridge: Patient Safety Research 
Programme of the Department of Health; 2010 [cited 2013 Nov 1]. Available from: 
http://publications.eng.cam.ac.uk/323930/ 
19.  Jun GT, Ward J, Clarkson PJ. Systems modelling approaches to the design of safe healthcare 
delivery: ease of use and usefulness perceived by healthcare workers. Ergonomics. 2010 
Jul;53(7):829–47.  
20.  Clarkson PJ, Ward JR, Buckle P, Berman J. Prospective Hazard Analysis Toolkit. Cambridge: 
University of Cambridge; 2010. Report No.: 978-0-9545243-4–0.  
21.  Runciman WB, Williamson JAH, Deakin A, Benveniste KA, Bannon K, Hibbert PD. An integrated 
framework for safety, quality and risk management: an information and incident management 
system based on a universal patient safety classification. Qual Saf Health Care. 2006 
Dec;15(Suppl 1):i82–90.  
22.  Vincent C, Taylor-Adams S, Stanhope N. Framework for analysing risk and safety in clinical 
medicine. BMJ. 1998 Nov 4;316(7138):1154–7.  
23.  Rogers S. A structured approach for the investigation of clinical incidents in health care: 
application in a general practice setting. Br J Gen Pract. 2002 Oct;52(Suppl):S30–2.  
24.  Carayon P, Schoofs Hundt A, Karsh B-T, Gurses AP, Alvarado CJ, Smith M, et al. Work system 
design for patient safety: the SEIPS model. Qual Saf Health Care. 2006 Dec;15 Suppl 1:i50-58.  
25.  NPSA. Root Cause Analysis Investigation Tools Contributory Factors Classification Framework. 
NPSA; 2009.  
26.  Wynn DC, Wyatt DF, Nair SMT, Clarkson PJ. An introduction to the Cambridge Advanced 
Modeller. In: 1st International Conference on Modelling and Management of Engineering 
Processes. Cambridge; 2010.  
27.  Colligan L, Anderson JE, Potts HW, Berman J. Does the process map influence the outcome of 
quality improvement work? A comparison of a sequential flow diagram and a hierarchical task 
analysis diagram. BMC Health Serv Res. 2010 Jan 7;10(1):7.  
 
 
 
 13 
TABLES 
No. Job title Experience 
in the NHS 
Familiarity with 
SMAs 
Experience and Purpose in using 
SMAs 
1 Service Manager 28 years Medium A couple of times - Risk assessment, 
operational policies, communication 
2 Consultant Psychiatrist 24 years Very familiar A couple of times - System 
understanding and communication 
3 Specialist R. Psychiatrist 10 years Medium Sometimes - Clinical training 
purposes 
4 Admin Support 3.5 years Not familiar at all None 
5 Clinical Psychologist 13 years Not familiar at all None 
6 Clinical Psychologist 5 years Not familiar at all None 
7 Specialty Registrar 12 years Medium None 
8 Nurse Specialist 24 years Medium None 
Table 1 Participants in SMA evaluation 
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Statement on Diagram’s 
Usefulness in Risk 
Identification within the 
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1. General usefulness in risk 
identification 
2.8 0.7 3.0 1.0 3.9 0.4 4.0 0.0 3.3 0.5 3.0 0.3 4.1 0.4 4.0 0.0 3.4 0.7 3.5 1.0 4.5 0.5 4.5 1.0 
1.1 Particular usefulness in 
identifying task-related risks 
1.8 0.7 2.0 1.0 2.8 0.9 2.5 1.3 3.3 0.7 3.0 1.0 3.5 0.5 3.5 1.0 2.8 0.9 2.5 1.3 3.8 0.5 4.0 0.3 
1.2 Particular usefulness in 
identifying equipment-related 
risks 
1.3 0.5 1.0 0.3 2.6 1.1 2.5 1.3 1.6 0.5 2.0 1.0 1.6 0.5 2.0 1.0 1.6 0.5 2.0 1.0 2.3 1.0 2.0 1.3 
1.3 Particular usefulness in 
identifying organisational risks 
2.5 0.5 2.5 1.0 2.4 0.7 2.5 1.0 2.4 0.7 2.5 1.0 3.1 0.8 3.0 1.3 2.8 0.9 2.5 1.3 3.4 0.7 3.5 1.0 
1.4 Particular usefulness in 
identifying environmental 
risks 
1.5 0.5 1.5 1.0 1.5 0.5 1.5 1.0 1.5 0.5 1.5 1.0 2.8 0.9 2.5 1.3 2.3 1.0 2.0 1.3 2.8 0.9 2.5 1.3 
1.5 Particular usefulness in 
identifying communication 
risks 
2.3 1.0 2.0 1.3 3.0 0.9 3.0 2.0 2.8 0.9 2.5 1.3 3.4 0.7 3.5 1.0 3.3 0.7 3.0 1.0 3.0 0.5 3.0 0.0 
1.6 Particular usefulness in 
identifying staff-related risks 
2.8 0.9 2.5 1.3 1.9 1.0 2.0 1.0 1.9 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.5 0.5 2.5 1.0 2.1 0.6 2.0 0.3 2.3 1.0 2.0 1.3 
1.7 Particular usefulness in 
identifying patient-related 
risks 
1.6 0.5 2.0 1.0 3.3 0.7 3.0 1.0 1.9 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.1 0.6 2.0 0.3 2.1 0.6 2.0 0.3 2.3 1.0 2.0 1.3 
Table 2 Summary Statistics of SMA Evaluation (n = 8)
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                   SMA type 
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Task-related risks   ✓ ✓  ✓ 
Environmental risks    ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Equipment-related risks  ✓    ✓ 
Communication risks  ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Organisational risks    ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Staff-sourced risks ✓   ✓  ✓ 
Patient-sourced risks  ✓    ✓ 
Table 3 SMAs and characteristics of risk sources 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1 Risk identification process 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Risk identification process with shortlisted SMAs (inputs) and risk sources (outputs). 
